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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(HONORABLE LARRY A. BURNS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANA BERNICE PALOS-MONTES, Defendant.	Case No.: 08CR1726-LAB Date: July 14, 2008 Time: 2:00 p.m. **NOTICE OF MOTIONS AND MOTIONS TO:** **(1) DISMISS THE INDICTMENT DUE TO MISINSTRUCTION OF THE GRAND JURY;** **(2) SUPPRESS STATEMENTS;** **(3) COMPEL DISCOVERY; AND** **(4) GRANT LEAVE TO FILE FURTHER MOTIONS**

TO: KAREN P. HEWITT, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY; AND
ALESSANDRA P. SERANO, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on July 14, 2008, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, the accused, Ana Bernice Palos-Montes, by and through her attorneys, Michelle Betancourt and Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., will ask this Court to enter an order granting the motions outlined below.

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MOTIONS

Defendant, Ms. Palos-Montes, by and through her attorneys, Michelle Betancourt and Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and all other applicable statutes, case law and local rules, hereby moves this Court for an order to:

(1) Dismiss the Indictment Due to Misinstruction of the Grand Jury;
(2) Suppress Statements;
(3) Compel Discovery; and
(4) Grant Leave to File Further Motions.

These motions are based upon the instant motions and notice of motions, the attached statement of facts and memorandum of points and authorities, and any and all other materials that may come to this Court's attention at or before the time of the hearing on these motions.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: June 30, 2008

/s/ Michelle Betancourt

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(HONORABLE LARRY A. BURNS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ANA PALOS-MONTES Defendant.	)	Case No.: 08CR1726-LAB Date: July 14, 2008 Time: 2:00 p.m. **STATEMENT OF FACTS AND POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS**

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 5, 2008, at about 2:00 p.m., Ms. Ana Palos-Montes arrived at the San Ysidro Port of Entry driving a 2000 Suzuki Vitara. At the primary booth, she presented her valid B1/B2 visa. Because of a computer generated referral, the primary inspector referred Ms. Palos-Montes to the secondary inspection area for a more thorough search.

At about 2:45 p.m., Officer Perez conducted a 7-point inspection of the Suzuki. During his search, he discovered a space discrepancy in the rear floor of the trunk area. Upon further inspection, Officer Perez found a compartment that contained 11 packages. The packages tested positive for cocaine and weighed approximately 12.45 kilos.

Ms. Palos-Montes was escorted into the secondary inspection office and made to wait until she was interrogated by Special Agent Ryan Preciado and Special Andrew Spillman. Ms. Palos-Montes was allegedly read her Miranda rights and then made a statement to the agents.

On May 28, 2008, the January 2007 Grand Jury panel issued an indictment charging Ms. Palos-Montes with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, Importation of Cocaine, and 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute. Ms. Palos-Montes has pled not guilty to these charges.

As of today, Ms. Palos-Montes has only received 51 pages of discovery. These motions follow.

II.

THE INDICTMENT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE JUDGE BURNS'S INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE PROVIDED TO THE JANUARY 2007 GRAND JURY RUN AFOUL OF BOTH *NAVARRO-VARGAS* AND *WILLIAMS* AND VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT BY DEPRIVING MS. PALOS-MONTES OF THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONING OF THE GRAND JURY

A. Introduction.

The indictment in the instant case was returned by the January 2007 grand jury. That grand jury was instructed by this Court on January 11, 2007. See Reporter's Partial Transcript of the Proceedings, dated January 11, 2007, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This Court's instructions to the impaneled grand jury deviate from the instructions at issue in the major Ninth Circuit cases challenging a form grand jury instruction previously given in this district in several ways.[1] These instructions compounded this Court's erroneous instructions and comments to prospective grand jurors during voir dire of the grand jury panel, which immediately preceded the instructions at Ex. A. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, dated January 11, 2007, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.[2]

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[1] See, e.g., United States v. Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 736 (2005) (Navarro-Vargas II); United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004)(Navarro-Vargas I); United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

[2] The transcript of the voir dire indicates that grand jurors were shown a video presentation on the role of the grand jury. Ms. Palos-Montes requests that the video presentation be produced. See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1029 n.21 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[t]he proceedings before the grand jury are secret, but the ground rules by which the grand jury conducts those proceedings are not.").

1. This Court Instructed Grand Jurors That Their Singular Duty Is to Determine Whether or Not Probable Cause Exists and That They Have No Right to Decline to Indict When the Probable Cause Standard Is Satisfied.

After repeatedly emphasizing to the grand jurors that probable cause determination was their sole responsibility, see Ex. A at 3, 3-4, 5,[3] this Court instructed the grand jurors that they were forbidden "from judg[ing] the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by Congress; that is, whether or not there should be a federal law or should not be a federal law designating certain activity [as] criminal is not up to you." See id. at 8. The instructions go beyond that, however, and tell the grand jurors that, should "you disagree with that judgment made by Congress, then your option is not to say 'well, I'm going to vote against indicting even though I think that the evidence is sufficient' or 'I'm going to vote in favor of even though the evidence may be insufficient.'" See id. at 8-9. Thus, the instruction flatly bars the grand jury from declining to indict because the grand jurors disagree with a proposed prosecution.

Immediately before limiting the grand jurors' powers in the way just described, this Court referred to an instance in the grand juror selection process in which it excused three potential jurors. See id. at 8.

> I've gone over this with a couple of people. You understood from the questions and answers that a couple of people were excused, I think three in this case, because they could not adhere to the principle that I'm about to tell you.

Id. That "principle" was this Court's discussion of the grand jurors' inability to give effect to their disagreement with Congress. See id. at 8-9. Thus, the Court not only instructed the grand jurors on its view of their discretion; it enforced that view on pain of being excused from service as a grand juror.

Examination of the recently disclosed voir dire transcript, which contains additional instructions and commentary in the form of the give and take between this Court and various prospective grand jurors, reveals how this Court's emphasis of the singular duty is to determine whether or not probable cause exists and his statement that grand jurors they cannot judge the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by Congress merely compounded an erroneous series of instructions already given to the grand jury venire. In one of his earliest substantive remarks, this Court makes clear that the grand jury's sole function is probable cause determination.

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[3] [5] See also id. at 20 ("You're all about probable cause.").

> [T]he grand jury is determining really two factors: "do we have a reasonable belief that a crime was committed? And second, do we have a reasonable belief that the person that they propose that we indict committed the crime?"
>
> If the answer is "yes" to both of those, then the case should move forward. If the answer to either of the questions is "no," then the grand jury should not hesitate and not indict.

See Ex. B at 8. In this passage, this Court twice uses the term "should" in a context makes clear that the term is employed to convey instruction: "should" cannot reasonably be read to mean optional when it addresses the obligation not to indict when the grand jury has no "reasonable belief that a crime was committed" or if it has no "reasonable belief that the person that they propose that we indict committed the crime."

Equally revealing is this Court's interactions with two potential grand jurors who indicated that, in some unknown set of circumstances, they might decline to indict even where there was probable cause. Because of the redactions of the grand jurors' names, Ms. Palos-Montes will refer to them by occupation. One is a retired clinical social worker (hereinafter CSW), and the other is a real estate agent (hereinafter REA). The CSW indicated a view that no drugs should be considered illegal and that some drug prosecutions were not an effective use of resources. See id. at 16. The CSW was also troubled by certain unspecified immigration cases. See id.

This Court made no effort to determine what sorts of drug and immigration cases troubled the CSW. He never inquired as to whether the CSW was at all troubled by the sorts of cases actually filed in this district, such as drug smuggling cases and cases involving reentry after deportation and alien smuggling. Rather, this Court provided instructions suggesting that, in any event, any scruples CSW may have possessed were simply not capable of expression in the context of grand jury service.

> Now, the question is can you fairly evaluate [drug cases and immigration cases]? Just as the defendant is ultimately entitled to a fair trial and the person that's accused is entitled to a fair appraisal of the evidence of the case that's in front of you, so, too, is the United States entitled to a fair judgment. If there's probable cause, then the case should go forward. *I wouldn't want you to say*, "well, yeah, there's probable cause, but I still don't like what our government is doing. I disagree with these laws, so I'm not going to vote for it to go forward." If that is your frame of mind, the probably you shouldn't serve. Only you can tell me that.

See id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). Thus, without any sort of context whatsoever, this Court let the grand juror know that it would not want him or her to decline to indict in an individual case where the grand juror "[didn't] like what our government is doing," see id. at 17, but in which there was probable cause. See Id. Such a case "should go forward." See id. Given that blanket proscription on grand juror discretion, made manifest by this Court's use of the pronoun "I", the CSW indicated that it "would be difficult to support a charge even if [the CSW] thought the evidence warranted it." See id. Again, this Court's question provided no context; it inquired regarding "a case," a term presumably just as applicable to possession of a small amount of medical marijuana as kilogram quantities of methamphetamine for distribution. Any grand juror listening to this exchange could only conclude that there was *no* case in which this Court would permit them to vote "no bill" in the face of a showing probable cause.

Just in case there may have been a grand juror that did not understand his or her inability to exercise anything like prosecutorial discretion, this Court drove the point home in his exchange with REA. REA first advised this Court of a concern regarding the "disparity between state and federal law" regarding "medical marijuana." See id. at 24. This Court first sought to address REA's concerns about medical marijuana by stating that grand jurors, like trial jurors, are simply forbidden from taking penalty considerations into account.

> Well, those things -- the consequences of your determination shouldn't concern you in the sense that penalties or punishment, things like that -- we tell trial jurors, of course, that they cannot consider the punishment or the consequence that Congress has set for these things. We'd ask you to also abide by that. We want you to make a business-like decision of whether there was a probable cause. . . .

Id. at 24-25. Having stated that REA was to "abide" by the instruction given to trial jurors, this Court went on to suggest that REA recuse him or herself from medical marijuana cases. See id. at 25.

In response to further questioning, REA disclosed REA's belief "that drugs should be legal." See id. That disclosure prompted this Court to begin a discussion that ultimately led to an instruction that a grand juror is obligated to vote to indict if there is probable cause.

> I can tell you sometimes I don't agree with some of the legal decisions that are indicated that I have to make. But my alternative is to vote for someone different, vote for someone that supports the policies I support and get the law changed. It's not for me to say, "well, I don't like it. So I'm not going to follow it here."

> You'd have a similar obligation as a grand juror even though you might have to grit your teeth on some cases. Philosophically, if you were a member of congress, you'd vote against, for example, criminalizing marijuana. I don't know if that's it, but you'd vote against criminalizing some drugs.
>
> That's not what your prerogative is here. You're prerogative instead is to act like a judge and say, "all right. This is what I've to deal with objectively. Does it seem to me that a crime was committed? Yes. Does it seem to me that this person's involved? It does." *And then your obligation, if you find those to be true, would be to vote in favor of the case going forward.*

Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the grand juror's duty is to conduct a simple two part test, which, if both questions are answered in the affirmative, lead to an "obligation" to indict.

Having set forth the duty to indict, and being advised that REA was "uncomfortable" with that paradigm, this Court then set about to ensure that there was no chance of a deviation from the obligation to indict in every case in which there was probable cause.

> The Court: Do you think you'd be inclined to let people go in drug cases even though you were convinced there was probable cause they committed a drug offense?
> REA: It would depend on the case.
> The Court: Is there a chance that you would do that?
> REA: Yes.
> The Court: I appreciate your answers. I'll excuse you at this time.

Id. at 27. Two aspects of this exchange are crucial. First, REA plainly does not intend to act solely on his political belief in decriminalization -- whether he or she would indict "depend[s] on the case," see id., as it should. Because REA's vote "depend[s] on the case," see id., it is necessarily true that REA would vote to indict in some (perhaps many or even nearly all) cases in which there was probable cause. Again, this Court made no effort to explore REA's views; it did not ascertain what sorts of cases would prompt REA to hesitate. The message is clear: it does not matter what type of case might prompt REA's reluctance to indict because, once the two part test is satisfied, the "obligation" is "to vote in favor of the case going forward."[4]

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[4] This point is underscored by this Court's explanation to the Grand Jury that a magistrate judge will have determined the existence of probable cause "in most circumstances" before it has been presented with any evidence. See Ex. A at 6. This instruction created an imprimatur of finding probable cause in each case because had a magistrate judge not so found, the case likely would not have been presented to the Grand Jury for indictment at all. The Grand Jury was informed that it merely was redundant to the magistrate court "in most circumstances." See id. This instruction made the grand jury more inclined to indict irrespective of the evidence presented.

See id. at 27. That is why even the "chance," see id., that a grand juror might not vote to indict was too great a risk to run.

2. The Instructions Posit a Non-Existent Prosecutorial Duty to Offer Exculpatory Evidence.

In addition to his instructions on the authority to choose not to indict, this Court also assured the grand jurors that prosecutors would present to them evidence that tended to undercut probable cause. See Ex. A at 20.

> Now, again, this emphasizes the difference between the function of the grand jury and the trial jury. You're all about probable cause. If you think that there's evidence out there that might cause you to say "well, I don't think probable cause exists," then it's incumbent upon you to hear that evidence as well. As I told you, in most instances, *the U.S. Attorneys are duty-bound to present evidence that cuts against what they may be asking you to do if they're aware of that evidence*.

Id. (emphasis added).

The antecedent to this instruction is also found in the voir dire. After advising the grand jurors that "the presentation of evidence to the grand jury is necessarily one-sided," see Ex. B at 14, this Court gratuitously added that "[his] experience is that the prosecutors don't play hide-the-ball. If there's something adverse or that cuts against the charge, you'll be informed of that. They have a duty to do that." See id. Thus, this Court unequivocally advised the grand jurors that the government would present any evidence that was "adverse" or "that cuts against the charge." See id.

B. Navarro-Vargas Establishes Limits on the Ability of Judges to Constrain the Powers of the Grand Jury, Which This Court Far Exceeded in His Instructions as a Whole During Impanelment.

The Ninth Circuit has, over vigorous dissents, rejected challenges to various instructions given to grand jurors in the Southern District of California. See Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d 1184. While the Ninth Circuit has thus far (narrowly) rejected such challenges, it has, in the course of adopting a highly formalistic approach[5] to the problems posed by the instructions, endorsed many of the substantive arguments raised by

[5] See Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d at 1210-11 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority because "[t]he instruction's use of the word 'should' is most likely to be understood as imposing an inflexible 'duty or obligation' on grand jurors, and thus to circumscribe the grand jury's constitutional independence.").

the defendants in those cases. The district court's instructions cannot be reconciled with the role of the grand jury as set forth in Navarro-Vargas II. Taken together, the voir dire of and instructions given to the January 2007 Grand Jury, go far beyond those at issue in Navarro-Vargas, taking a giant leap in the direction of a bureaucratic, deferential grand jury, focused solely upon probable cause determinations and utterly unable to exercise any quasi-prosecutorial discretion. That is not the institution the Framers envisioned. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992).

For instance, with respect to the grand jury's relationship with the prosecution, the Navarro-Vargas II majority acknowledges that the two institutions perform similar functions: "'the public prosecutor, in deciding whether a particular prosecution shall be instituted or followed up, performs much the same function as a grand jury.'" Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510 (1978)). Accord United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2004) (Navarro-Vargas I)(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (The grand jury's discretion in this regard "is most accurately described as prosecutorial."). See also Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d at 1213 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). It recognizes that the prosecutor is not obligated to proceed on any indictment or presentment returned by a grand jury, id., but also that "the grand jury has no obligation to prepare a presentment or to return an indictment drafted by the prosecutor." Id. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 Geo. L.J. 1265, 1302 (2006) (the grand jury's discretion not to indict was "'arguably . . . the most important attribute of grand jury review from the perspective of those who insisted that a grand jury clause be included in the Bill of Rights'") (quoting Wayne LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 15.2(g) (2d ed. 1999)).

Indeed, the Navarro-Vargas II majority agrees that the grand jury possesses all the attributes set forth in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). See id.

> The grand jury thus determines not only whether probable cause exists, but also whether to "charge a greater offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most significant of all, a capital offense or a non-capital offense -- all on the basis of the same facts. And, significantly, the grand jury may refuse to return an indictment even "'where a conviction can be obtained.'"

Id. (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263). The Supreme Court has itself reaffirmed Vasquez's description of the grand jury's attributes in Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998), noting that the grand jury "controls not only the initial decision to indict, but also significant questions such as how many counts to charge and whether to charge a greater or lesser offense, including the important decision whether to charge a capital crime." Id. at 399 (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263). Judge Hawkins notes that the Navarro-Vargas II majority accepts the major premise of Vasquez: "the majority agrees that a grand jury has the power to refuse to indict someone even when the prosecutor has established probable cause that this individual has committed a crime." See id. at 1214 (Hawkins, J. dissenting). Accord Navarro-Vargas I, 367 F.3d at 899 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1166-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (Hawkins, J., dissenting). In short, the grand jurors' prerogative not to indict enjoys strong support in the Ninth Circuit. But not in this Court's instructions.

C. This Court's Instructions Forbid the Exercise of Grand Jury Discretion Established in Both *Vasquez* and *Navarro-Vargas II*.

The Navarro-Vargas II majority found that the instruction in that case "leave[s] room for the grand jury to dismiss even if it finds probable cause," 408 F.3d at 1205, adopting the analysis in its previous decision in Marcucci. Marcucci reasoned that the instructions do not mandate that grand jurors indict upon every finding of probable cause because the term "should" may mean "what is probable or expected." 299 F.3d at 1164 (citation omitted). That reading of the term "should" makes no sense in context, as Judge Hawkins ably pointed out. See Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d at 1210-11 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("The instruction's use of the word 'should' is most likely to be understood as imposing an inflexible 'duty or obligation' on grand jurors, and thus to circumscribe the grand jury's constitutional independence."). See also id. ("The 'word' should is used to express a duty [or] obligation.") (quoting The Oxford American Diction and Language Guide 1579 (1999) (brackets in original)).

The debate about what the word "should" means is irrelevant here; the instructions here make no such fine distinction. The grand jury instructions make it painfully clear that grand jurors simply may not choose not to indict in the event of what appears to them to be an unfair application of the law: should "you disagree with that judgment made by Congress, then your option is not to say 'well, I'm going to vote against indicting even though I think that the evidence is sufficient'...." See Ex. A at 8-9. Thus, the instruction flatly bars the grand jury from declining to indict because they disagree with a proposed prosecution. No grand juror would read this language as instructing, or even allowing, him or her to assess "the need to indict." Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 264.

While this Court used the word "should" instead of "shall" during voir dire with respect to whether an indictment was required if probable cause existed, see Ex. B at 4, 8, in context, it is clear that this Court could only mean "should" in the obligatory sense. For example, when addressing a prospective juror, this Court not only told the jurors that they "should" indict if there is probable cause, it told them that if there is not probable cause, "then the grand jury should hesitate and not indict." See id. at 8. At least in context, it would strain credulity to suggest that this Court was using "should" for the purpose of "leaving room for the grand jury to [indict] even if it finds [no] probable cause." See Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1205. Clearly this Court was not.

The full passage cited above effectively eliminates any possibility that this Court intended the Navarro-Vargas spin on the word "should."

> [T]he grand jury is determining really two factors: "do we have a reasonable belief that a crime was committed? And second, do we have a reasonable belief that the person that they propose that we indict committed the crime?"
>
> If the answer is "yes" to both of those, then the case should move forward. If the answer to either of the questions is "no," then the grand jury should not hesitate and not indict.

See Ex. B at 8. Of the two sentences containing the word "should," the latter of the two essentially states that if there is no probable cause, you *should* not indict. This Court could not possibly have intended to "leav[e] room for the grand jury to [indict] even if it finds [no] probable cause." See Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1205 (citing Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1159). That would contravene the grand jury's historic role of protecting the innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (The grand jury's "responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable cause and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.") (citation omitted).

By the same token, if this Court said that "the case should move forward" if there is probable cause, but intended to "leav[e] room for the grand jury to dismiss even if it finds probable cause," see Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1205 (citing Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1159), then this Court would have to have intended two different meanings of the word "should" in the space of two consecutive sentences. That could not have been his intent. But even if it were, no grand jury could ever have had that understanding.[6] Jurors are not presumed to be capable of sorting through internally contradictory instructions. See generally United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 234 (9th Cir. 1995) ("where two instructions conflict, a reviewing court cannot presume that the jury followed the correct one") (citation, internal quotations and brackets omitted).

Lest there be any room for ambiguity, on no less than four occasions, this Court made it explicitly clear to the grand jurors that "should" was not merely suggestive, but obligatory:

(1) The first occasion occurred in the following exchange when this Court conducted voir dire and excused a potential juror (CSW):

> The Court: . . . If there's probable cause, then the case should go forward. I wouldn't want you to say, "Well, yeah, there's probable cause. But I still don't like what the government is doing. I disagree with these laws, so I'm not going to vote for it to go forward." If that's your frame of mind, then probably you shouldn't serve. Only you can tell me that.
> Prospective Juror: Well, I think I may fall in that category.
> The Court: In the latter category?
> Prospective Juror: Yes.
> The Court: Where it would be difficult for you to support a charge even if you thought the evidence warranted it?
> Prospective Juror: Yes.
> The Court: I'm going to excuse you then.

See Ex. B at 17. There was nothing ambiguous about the word "should" in this exchange with a prospective juror. Even if the prospective juror did not like what the government was doing in a particular case, that case "should go forward" and this Court expressly disapproved of any vote that might prevent that. See id. ("I wouldn't want you [to vote against such a case]"). The sanction for the possibility of independent judgment was dismissal, a result that provided full deterrence of that juror's discretion and secondary deterrence as to the exercise of discretion by any other prospective grand juror.

(2) In an even more explicit example of what "should" meant, this Court makes clear that it there is an unbending obligation to indict if there is probable cause. Grand jurors have no other prerogative.

Court . . . It's not for me to say, "Well, I don't like it. So I'm not going to follow it here."

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[6] This argument does not turn on Ms. Palos-Montes's view that the Navarro-Vargas/Marcucci reading of the word "should" in the model instructions is wildly implausible. Rather, it turns on the context in which the word is employed by this Court in his unique instructions, context which eliminates the Navarro-Vargas/Marcucci reading as a possibility.

> You'd have a similar *obligation* as a grand juror even though you might have to grit your teeth on some cases. Philosophically, if you were a member of Congress, you'd vote against, for example, criminalizing marijuana. I don't know if that's it, but you'd vote against criminalizing some drugs.
>
> That's not what your *prerogative* is here. Your prerogative instead is act like a judge and to say, "All right. This is what I've got to deal with objectively. Does it seem to me that a crime was committed? Yes. Does it seem to me that this person's involved? It does." *And then your obligation, if you find those things to be true, would be to vote in favor of the case going forward.*

Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added). After telling this potential juror (REA) what his obligations and prerogatives were, the Court inquired as to whether "you'd be inclined to let people go on drug cases even though you were convinced there was probable cause they committed a drug offense?" Id. at 27. The potential juror responded: "It would depend on the case." Id. Nevertheless, that juror was excused. Id. at 28. Again, in this context, and contrary to the situation in Navarro-Vargas, "should" means "shall"; it is obligatory, and the juror has no prerogative to do anything other than indict if there is probable cause.

Moreover, as this example demonstrates, the issue is not limited to whether the grand jury believes a particular law to be "unwise." This juror said that any decision to indict would not depend on the law, but rather it would "depend on the case." Thus, it is clear that this Court's point was that if a juror could not indict on probable cause for *every* case, then that juror was not fit for service. It is equally clear that the prospective juror did not dispute the "wisdom of the law;" he was prepared to indict under some factual scenarios, perhaps many. But this Court did not pursue the question of what factual scenarios troubled the prospective jurors, because his message is that there is no discretion not to indict.

(3) As if the preceding examples were not enough, this Court continued to pound the point home that "should" meant "shall" when it told another grand juror during voir dire: "[W]hat I have to insist on is that you follow the law that's given to us by the United States Congress. We enforce the federal laws here." See id. at 61.

(4) And then again, after swearing in all the grand jurors who had already agreed to indict in every case where there was probable cause, this Court reiterated that "should" means "shall" when it reminded them that "your option is not to say 'well, I'm going to vote against indicting even though I think that the evidence is sufficient . . . . Instead your *obligation* is . . . not to bring your personal definition of what the law ought to be and try to impose that through applying it in a grand jury setting." See Ex. A at 9.

Moreover, this Court advised the grand jurors that the were forbidden from considering the penalties to which indicted persons may be subject.

> Prospective Juror (REA): ... And as far as being fair, it kind of depends on what the case is about because there is a disparity between state and federal law.
> The Court: In what regard?
> Prospective Juror: Specifically, medical marijuana.
> The Court: Well, those things -- the consequences of your determination shouldn't concern you in the sense that penalties or punishment, things like that -- *we tell trial jurors, of course, that they cannot consider the punishment or the consequence that Congress has set for these things. We'd ask you to also abide by that.* We want you to make a business-like decision of whether there was a probable cause. ...

See Ex. B at 24-25 (emphasis added). A "business-like decision of whether there was a probable cause" would obviously leave no role for the consideration of penalty information.

The Ninth Circuit previously rejected a claim based upon the proscription against consideration of penalty information based upon the same unlikely reading of the word "should" employed in Marcucci. See United States v. Cortez-Rivera, 454 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2006). Cortez-Rivera is inapposite for two reasons. First, this Court did not use the term "should" in the passage quoted above. Second, that context, as well as his consistent use of a mandatory meaning in employing the term, eliminate the ambiguity (if there ever was any) relied upon by Cortez-Rivera. The instructions again violate Vasquez, which plainly authorized consideration of penalty information. See 474 U.S. at 263.

Noting can mask the undeniable fact that this Court explicitly instructed the jurors time and time again that they had a duty, an obligation, and a singular prerogative to indict each and every case where there was probable cause. These instructions go far beyond the holding of Navarro-Vargas and stand in direct contradiction of the Supreme Court's decision in Vasquez. Indeed, it defies credulity to suggest that a grand juror hearing these instructions, and that voir dire, could possibly believe what the Supreme Court held in Vasquez:

> The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most significant of all, a capital offense or a non-capital offense – all on the basis of the same facts. Moreover, "[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained."

474 U.S. at 263 (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2nd Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting)); accord Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 399 (1998) (The grand jury "controls not only the initial decision to indict, but also significant decisions such as how many counts to charge and whether to charge a greater or lesser offense, including the important decision whether to charge a capital crime."). Nor would the January 2007 grand jury ever believe that it was empowered to assess the "the need to indict." See id. at 264. This Court's grand jury is not Vasquez's grand jury. The instructions therefore represent structural constitutional error "that interferes with the grand jury's independence and the integrity of the grand jury proceeding." See United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1992). The indictment must therefore be dismissed. Id.

The Navarro-Vargas II majority's faith in the structure of the grand jury *is not* a cure for the instructions excesses. The Navarro-Vargas II majority attributes "[t]he grand jury's discretion -- its independence -- [to] the absolute secrecy of its deliberations and vote and the unreviewability of its decisions." 408 F.3d at 1200. As a result, the majority discounts the effect that a judge's instructions may have on a grand jury because "it is the *structure* of the grand jury process and its *function* that make it independent." Id. at 1202 (emphases in the original).

Judge Hawkins sharply criticized this approach. The majority, he explains, "believes that the 'structure' and 'function' of the grand jury -- particularly the secrecy of the proceedings and unreviewability of many of its decisions -- sufficiently protects that power." See id. at 1214 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). The flaw in the majority's analysis is that "[i]nstructing a grand jury that it lacks power to do anything beyond making a probable cause determination ... unconstitutionally undermines the very structural protections that the majority believes save[] the instruction." Id. After all, it is an "'almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions.'" Id. (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). If that "invariable assumption" were to hold true, then the grand jurors could not possibly fulfill the role described in Vasquez. Indeed, "there is something supremely cynical about saying that it is fine to give jurors erroneous instructions because nothing will happen if they disobey them." Id.

In setting forth Judge Hawkins' views, Ms. Palos-Montes understands that this Court may not adopt them solely because the reasoning that supports them is so much more persuasive than the majority's sophistry. Rather, he sets them forth to urge the Court *not to extend* what is already untenable reasoning.

Here, again, the question is not an obscure interpretation of the word "should", especially in light of the instructions and commentary by this Court during voir dire discussed above - unaccounted for by the Court in Navarro-Vargas II because they had not yet been disclosed to the defense, but an absolute ban on the right to refuse to indict that directly conflicts with the recognition of that right in Vasquez, Campbell, and both Navarro-Vargas II opinions. Navarro-Vargas II is distinguishable on that basis, but not only that.

This Court did not limit itself to denying the grand jurors the power that Vasquez plainly states they enjoy. He also excused prospective grand jurors who might have exercised that Fifth Amendment prerogative, excusing "three [jurors] in this case, because they could not adhere to [that] principle...." See Ex. A at 8; Ex. B at 17, 28. The structure of the grand jury and the secrecy of its deliberations cannot embolden grand jurors who are no longer there, likely because they expressed their willingness to act as the conscience of the community. See Navarro-Vargas II, 408 F.3d at 1210-11 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (a grand jury exercising its powers under Vasquez "serves ... to protect the accused from the other branches of government by acting as the 'conscience of the community.'") (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The federal courts possess only "very limited" power "to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure," United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992), and, here, this Court has both fashioned his own rules and enforced them.

D. The Instructions Conflict with Williams' Holding That There Is No Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury.

In Williams, the defendant, although conceding that it was not required by the Fifth Amendment, argued that the federal courts should exercise their supervisory power to order prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand jurors, or, perhaps, to find such disclosure required by Fifth Amendment common law. See 504 U.S. at 45, 51. Williams held that "as a general matter at least, no such 'supervisory' judicial authority exists." See id. at 47. Indeed, although the supervisory power may provide the authority "to dismiss an indictment because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that misconduct amounts to a violation of one of those 'few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury's functions,'" id. at 46 (citation omitted), it does not serve as "a means of *prescribing* such standards of prosecutorial conduct in the first instance." Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The federal courts possess only "very limited" power "to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure." Id. at 50. As a consequence, Williams rejected the defendant's claim, both as an exercise of supervisory power and as Fifth Amendment common law. See id. at 51-55.

Despite the holding in Williams, the instructions here assure the grand jurors that prosecutors would present to them evidence that tended to undercut probable cause. See Ex. A at 20.

> Now, again, this emphasizes the difference between the function of the grand jury and the trial jury. You're all about probable cause. If you think that there's evidence out there that might cause you say "well, I don't think probable cause exists," then it's incumbent upon you to hear that evidence as well. As I told you, in most instances, *the U.S. Attorneys are duty-bound to present evidence that cuts against what they may be asking you to do if they're aware of that evidence*.

Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the district court later returned to the notion of the prosecutors and their duties, advising the grand jurors that they "can expect that the U.S. Attorneys that will appear in from of [them] will be candid, they'll be honest, and ... they'll act in good faith in all matters presented to you." See id. at 27. The Ninth Circuit has already concluded it is likely this final comment is "unnecessary." See Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1207.

This particular instruction has a devastating effect on the grand jury's protective powers, particularly if it is not true. It begins by emphasizing the message that Navarro-Vargas II somehow concluded was not conveyed by the previous instruction: "You're all about probable cause." See Ex. A at 20. Thus, once again, the grand jury is reminded that they are limited to probable cause determinations (a reminder that was probably unnecessary in light of the fact that this Court had already told the grand jurors that they likely would be excused if they rejected this limitation). The instruction goes on to tell the grand jurors that they should consider evidence that undercuts probable cause, but also advises the grand jurors that the prosecutor will present it. The end result, then, is that grand jurors should consider evidence that goes against probable cause, but, if none is presented by the government, they can presume that there is none. After all, "in most instances, the U.S. Attorneys are duty-bound to present evidence that cuts against what they may be asking you to do if they're aware of that evidence." See id. Moreover, during voir dire, this Court informed the jurors that "my experience is that the prosecutors don't play hide-the-ball. If there's something adverse or that cuts against the charge, you'll be informed of that. *They have a duty to do that*." See Ex. B at 14-15 (emphasis added). Thus, if the exculpatory evidence existed, it necessarily would have been presented by the "duty-bound" prosecutor, because the grand jurors "can expect that the U.S. Attorneys that will appear in from of [them] will be candid, they'll be honest, and ... they'll act in good faith in all matters presented to you." See Ex. A at 27.

These instructions create a presumption that, in cases where the prosecutor does not present exculpatory evidence, no exculpatory evidence exists. A grand juror's reasoning, in a case in which no exculpatory evidence was presented, would proceed along these lines:

(1) I have to consider evidence that undercuts probable cause.
(2) The candid, honest, duty-bound prosecutor would, in good faith, have presented any such evidence to me, if it existed.
(3) Because no such evidence was presented to me, I may conclude that there is none.

Even if some exculpatory evidence were presented, a grand juror would necessarily presume that the evidence presented represents the universe of all available exculpatory evidence; if there was more, the duty-bound prosecutor would have presented it.

The instructions, therefore, discourage investigation -- if exculpatory evidence were out there, the prosecutor would present it, so investigation is a waste of time -- and provide additional support to every probable cause determination: i.e., this case may be weak, but I know that there is nothing on the other side of the equation because it was not presented. A grand jury so badly misguided is no grand jury at all under the Fifth Amendment.

III.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

Ms. Palos-Montes moves to suppress any statements made at the time of her arrest on the grounds that her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Moreover, Ms. Palos-Montes moves to suppress any other statements made on the grounds that those statements were not made voluntarily.

A. The Government must demonstrate compliance with *Miranda*.

In order for any statements made by Ms. Palos-Montes to be admissible against her, the government must demonstrate that they were obtained in compliance with the Miranda decision.

1. Ms. Palos-Montes's Waiver Must Be Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent.

Despite the discovery provided thus far, the question remains whether Ms. Palos-Montes waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). When interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, and a statement results, the government has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant has intelligently and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. The court must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, so the burden on the government is great. United States v. Heldt, 745 F. 2d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).

In determining whether a waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); United States v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has held that determination of the validity of a Miranda waiver requires a two prong analysis: the waiver must be both (1) voluntary and (2) knowing and intelligent. Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F. 2d 813 (9th Cir. 1990). The second prong requires an inquiry into whether "the waiver [was] made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Id. at 820-821 (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987)). Not only must the waiver be uncoerced, then, it must also involve a "requisite level of comprehension" before a court may conclude that Miranda rights have been legitimately waived. Id. (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at 573).

Unless and until Miranda warnings and a knowing and intelligent waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against the defendant. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The government in this case must prove that Ms. Palos-Montes waived his rights intelligently and voluntarily. Ms. Palos-Montes disputes any allegation that his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily.

2. Ms. Palos-Montes's Statements Must be Voluntary.

Even if Ms. Palos-Montes's statements were made after a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, they must have been made voluntarily, or they must be suppressed. The Supreme Court has held that even where the procedural safeguards of Miranda are satisfied, a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded on involuntary statements. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964); see also United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1985)("an accused is deprived of due process if his conviction rests wholly or partially upon an involuntary confession, even if the statement is true, and even if there is ample independent evidence of guilt."). The government has the burden of proving that statements are voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972). An accused's confession must result from an "independent and informed choice of his own free will, possessing the capability to do so, his will not being overborne by the pressures and circumstances swirling around him." Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F. 2d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1985), modified, 781 F. 2d 185 (11th Cir.) (quotations omitted).

To be considered voluntary, a statement must be the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).[7] A confession is deemed involuntary not only if coerced by physical intimidation, but also if achieved through psychological pressure. "The test is whether the confession was 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.'" Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)); accord, United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, Ms. Palos-Montes's statements were involuntary. An evidentiary hearing in this case will reveal this case is indistinguishable from United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, suppression of Ms. Palos-Montes's statements is required.

B. This Court Must Conduct an Evidentiary Hearing.

[7] Among the factors which are considered are the youth of the accused, his lack of education, his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), this Court is required to determine, outside the presence of the jury, whether any statements made by Ms. Palos-Montes are voluntary. In addition, section 3501(b) requires this Court to consider various enumerated factors, including whether Ms. Palos-Montes understood the nature of the charges against his and whether he understood his rights. Without evidence, this Court cannot adequately consider these statutorily mandated factors.

Moreover, section 3501(a) requires this Court to make a factual determination. Where a factual determination is required, courts are obligated to make factual findings by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12. See United States v. Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d 601, 606-10 (9th Cir. 1990). Because "`suppression hearings are often as important as the trial itself,'" Id. at 610 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)), these findings should be supported by evidence, not merely an unsubstantiated recitation of purported evidence in a prosecutor's responsive pleading.

IV.

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Ms. Palos-Montes moves for the production of the following discovery. This request is not limited to those items that the prosecutor knows of, but rather includes all discovery listed below that is in the custody, control, care, or knowledge of any “closely related investigative [or other] agencies.” See United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858 (1989).

(1) The Defendant’s Statements. The Government must disclose to the defendant all copies of any written or recorded statements made by the defendant; the substance of any statements made by the defendant which the Government intends to offer in evidence at trial; any response by the defendant to interrogation; the substance of any oral statements which the Government intends to introduce at trial and any written summaries of the defendant’s oral statements contained in the handwritten notes of the Government agent; any response to any Miranda warnings which may have been given to the defendant; as well as any other statements by the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A). The Advisory Committee Notes and the 1991 amendments to Rule 16 make clear that the Government must reveal all the defendant’s statements, whether oral or written, regardless of whether the government intends to make any use of those statements.

(2) Arrest Reports, Notes and Dispatch Tapes. The defendant also specifically requests the Government to turn over all arrest reports, notes, dispatch or any other tapes, and TECS records that relate to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or any questioning. This request includes, but is not limited to, any rough notes, records, reports, transcripts or other documents in which statements of the defendant or any other discoverable material is contained. Such material is discoverable under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Government must produce arrest reports, investigator's notes, memos from arresting officers, dispatch tapes, sworn statements, and prosecution reports pertaining to the defendant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B) and (c), Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 and 12(I).

(3) Brady Material. The defendant requests all documents, statements, agents' reports, and tangible evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of guilt and/or which affects the credibility of the Government's case. Under Brady, impeachment as well as exculpatory evidence falls within the definition of evidence favorable to the accused. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).

(4) Any Information That May Result in a Lower Sentence Under The Guidelines. The Government must produce this information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This request includes any cooperation or attempted cooperation by the defendant as well as any information that could affect any base offense level or specific offense characteristic under Chapter Two of the Guidelines. The defendant also requests any information relevant to a Chapter Three adjustment, a determination of the defendant's criminal history, and information relevant to any other application of the Guidelines.

(5) The Defendant's Prior Record. The defendant requests disclosure of his prior record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B).

(6) Any Proposed 404(b) Evidence. The government must produce evidence of prior similar acts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and 609. In addition, under Rule 404(b), "upon request of the accused, the prosecution . . . shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature . . ." of any evidence the government proposes to introduce under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) at trial. The defendant requests that such notice be given three (3) weeks before trial in order to give the defense time to adequately investigate and prepare for trial.

(7) Evidence Seized. The defendant requests production of evidence seized as a result of any search, either warrantless or with a warrant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(c).

(8) Tangible Objects. The defendant requests the opportunity to inspect and copy as well as test, if necessary, all other documents and tangible objects, including photographs, books, papers, documents, fingerprint analyses, vehicles, or copies of portions thereof, which are material to the defense or intended for use in the Government's case-in-chief or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2)(c).

(9) Evidence of Bias or Motive to Lie. The defendant requests any evidence that any prospective Government witness is biased or prejudiced against the defendant, or has a motive to falsify or distort his or his testimony.

(10) Impeachment Evidence. The defendant requests any evidence that any prospective Government witness has engaged in any criminal act whether or not resulting in a conviction and whether any witness has made a statement favorable to the defendant. See Fed R. Evid. 608, 609 and 613; Brady v. Maryland, supra.

(11) Evidence of Criminal Investigation of Any Government Witness. The defendant requests any evidence that any prospective witness is under investigation by federal, state or local authorities for any criminal conduct.

(12) Evidence Affecting Perception, Recollection, Ability to Communicate, or Truth Telling. The defense requests any evidence, including any medical or psychiatric report or evaluation, that tends to show that any prospective witness' ability to perceive, remember, communicate, or tell the truth is impaired, and any evidence that a witness has ever used narcotics or other controlled substance, or has ever been an alcoholic.

(13) Witness Addresses. The defendant requests the name and last known address of each prospective Government witness. The defendant also requests the name and last known address of every witness to the crime or crimes charged (or any of the overt acts committed in furtherance thereof) who will not be called as a Government witness.

(14) Name of Witnesses Favorable to the Defendant. The defendant requests the name of any witness who made an arguably favorable statement concerning the defendant or who could not identify him who was unsure of his identity, or participation in the crime charged.

(15) Statements Relevant to the Defense. The defendant requests disclosure of any statement relevant to any possible defense or contention that he might assert.

(16) Jencks Act Material. The defendant requests production in advance of trial of all material, including dispatch tapes, which the government must produce pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Advance production will avoid the possibility of delay at the request of defendant to investigate the Jencks material. A verbal acknowledgment that "rough" notes constitute an accurate account of the witness' interview is sufficient for the report or notes to qualify as a statement under § 3500(e)(1). Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 490-92 (1963). In United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991) the Ninth Circuit held that when an agent goes over interview notes with the subject of the interview the notes are then subject to the Jencks Act.

(17) Giglio Information. Pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the defendant requests all statements and/or promises, express or implied, made to any Government witnesses, in exchange for their testimony in this case, and all other information which could arguably be used for the impeachment of any Government witnesses.

(18) Agreements Between the Government and Witnesses. The defendant requests discovery regarding any express or implicit promise, understanding, offer of immunity, of past, present, or future compensation, or any other kind of agreement or understanding, including any implicit understanding relating to criminal or civil income tax, forfeiture or fine liability, between any prospective Government witness and the Government (federal, state and/or local). This request also includes any discussion with a potential witness about or advice concerning any contemplated prosecution, or any possible plea bargain, even if no bargain was made, or the advice not followed.

(19) Informants and Cooperating Witnesses. The defendant requests disclosure of the names and addresses of all informants or cooperating witnesses used or to be used in this case, and in particular, disclosure of any informant who was a percipient witness in this case or otherwise participated in the crime

charged against Ms. Palos-Montes. The Government must disclose the informant's identity and location, as well as disclose the existence of any other percipient witness unknown or unknowable to the defense. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61-62 (1957). The Government must disclose any information derived from informants which exculpates or tends to exculpate the defendant.

(20) Bias by Informants or Cooperating Witnesses. The defendant requests disclosure of any information indicating bias on the part of any informant or cooperating witness. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Such information would include what, if any, inducements, favors, payments or threats were made to the witness to secure cooperation with the authorities.

(21) Government Examination of Law Enforcement Personnel Files. Ms. Palos-Montes requests that the Government examine the personnel files and any other files within its custody, care or control, or which could be obtained by the government, for all testifying witnesses, including testifying officers. Mr. Maldonado-Perez requests that these files be reviewed by the Government attorney for evidence of perjurious conduct or other like dishonesty, or any other material relevant to impeachment, or any information that is exculpatory, pursuant to its duty under United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991). The obligation to examine files arises by virtue of the defense making a demand for their review: the Ninth Circuit in Henthorn remanded for in camera review of the agents' files because the government failed to examine the files of agents who testified at trial. This Court should therefore order the Government to review all such files for all testifying witnesses and turn over any material relevant to impeachment or that is exculpatory to Ms. Palos-Montes prior to trial. Ms. Palos-Montes specifically requests that the prosecutor, not the law enforcement officers, review the files in this case. The duty to review the files, under Henthorn, should be the prosecutor's. Only the prosecutor has the legal knowledge and ethical obligations to fully comply with this request.

(22) Expert Summaries. Defendant requests written summaries and results of any experiments of all expert testimony that the government intends to present under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703 or 705 during its case in chief, written summaries of the bases for each expert's opinion, and written summaries of the experts' qualifications. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). This request includes, but is not limited to, fingerprint expert testimony.

(23) Residual Request. Ms. Palos-Montes intends by this discovery motion to invoke his rights to discovery to the fullest extent possible under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution and laws of the United States. This request specifically includes all subsections of Rule 16. Ms. Palos-Montes requests that the Government provide him and his attorney with the above requested material sufficiently in advance of trial to avoid unnecessary delay prior to cross-examination.

V.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS

Defense counsel requests leave to file further motions and notices of defense based upon information gained in the discovery process. To date, counsel has not received **any** discovery from the government in this matter.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For these and all the foregoing reasons, the defendant, Ms. Palos-Montes, respectfully requests that this court grant his motions and grant any and all other relief deemed proper and fair.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED: June 30, 2008

/s/ Michelle Betancourt

MICHELLE BETANCOURT
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Attorneys for Ms. Palos-Montes
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Exhibit "A"

Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings
Wednesday, January 11, 2007

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: THE IMPANELMENT)
)
OF GRAND JURY PANELS 07-1 AND)
)
07-2)
)
)
________________________________)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORTER'S PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007

COURT REPORTER: EVA OEMICK
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
940 FRONT STREET, STE. 2190
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101
TEL: (619) 615-3103

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA-WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007-9:30 A.M.

THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO SIT ON THE GRAND JURY. IF YOU'LL STAND AND RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND, PLEASE.

MR. HAMRICK: DO YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, SOLEMNLY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT YOU SHALL DILIGENTLY INQUIRE INTO AND MAKE TRUE PRESENTMENT OR INDICTMENT OF ALL MATTERS AND THINGS AS SHALL BE GIVEN TO YOU IN CHARGE OR OTHERWISE COME TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE TOUCHING YOUR GRAND JURY SERVICE; TO KEEP SECRET THE COUNSEL OF THE UNITED STATES, YOUR FELLOWS AND YOURSELVES; NOT TO PRESENT OR INDICT ANY PERSON THROUGH HATRED, MALICE OR ILL WILL; NOR LEAVE ANY PERSON UNREPRESENTED OR UNINDICTED THROUGH FEAR, FAVOR, OR AFFECTION, NOR FOR ANY REWARD, OR HOPE OR PROMISE THEREOF; BUT IN ALL YOUR PRESENTMENTS AND INDICTMENTS TO PRESENT THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, TO THE BEST OF YOUR SKILL AND UNDERSTANDING?

IF SO, ANSWER, "I DO."

(ALL GRAND JURORS ANSWER AFFIRMATIVELY)

THE COURT: ALL JURORS HAVE TAKEN THE OATH AND ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY.

IF YOU'LL HAVE A SEAT. WE ARE NEARLY COMPLETED WITH THIS PROCESS.

I AM OBLIGATED BY THE CONVENTION OF THE COURT AND THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES TO GIVE YOU A FURTHER CHARGE REGARDING YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS GRAND JURORS. THIS WILL

APPLY NOT ONLY TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN SWORN, BUT THE REST OF YOU WHOSE NAMES HAVE NOT YET BEEN CALLED, YOU ARE GOING TO BE PUT IN RESERVE FOR US.

AND IF DISABILITIES OCCUR -- I DON'T MEAN IN A PHYSICAL SENSE, BUT PEOPLE MOVE OR SITUATIONS COME UP WHERE SOME OF THE FOLKS THAT HAVE BEEN SWORN IN TODAY ARE RELIEVED, YOU WILL BE CALLED AS REPLACEMENT GRAND JURORS. SO THESE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY TO ALL WHO ARE ASSEMBLED HERE TODAY.

NOW THAT YOU HAVE BEEN IMPANELED AND SWORN AS A GRAND JURY, IT'S THE COURT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO INSTRUCT YOU ON THE LAW WHICH GOVERNS YOUR ACTIONS AND YOUR DELIBERATIONS AS GRAND JURORS.

THE FRAMERS OF OUR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION DETERMINED AND DEEMED THE GRAND JURY SO IMPORTANT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE THAT THEY INCLUDED A PROVISION FOR THE GRAND JURY IN OUR BILL OF RIGHTS.

AS I SAID BEFORE, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION PROVIDES, IN PART, THAT NO PERSON SHALL BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR A CAPITAL OR OTHERWISE INFAMOUS CRIME WITHOUT ACTION BY THE GRAND JURY.

WHAT THAT MEANS IN A VERY REAL SENSE IS YOU'RE THE BUFFER BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S POWER TO CHARGE SOMEONE WITH A CRIME AND THAT CASE GOING FORWARD OR NOT GOING FORWARD.

THE FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY, IN FEDERAL COURT AT LEAST, IS TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE. THAT'S THE SIMPLE

FORMULATION THAT I MENTIONED TO A NUMBER OF YOU DURING THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS. PROBABLE CAUSE IS JUST AN ANALYSIS OF WHETHER A CRIME WAS COMMITTED AND THERE'S A REASONABLE BASIS TO BELIEVE THAT AND WHETHER A CERTAIN PERSON IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMISSION OF THAT CRIME, COMMITTED IT OR HELPED COMMIT IT.

IF THE ANSWER IS YES, THEN AS GRAND JURORS YOUR FUNCTION IS TO FIND THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS THERE, THAT THE CASE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIATED, AND IT SHOULD MOVE FORWARD. IF CONSCIENTIOUSLY, AFTER LISTENING TO THE EVIDENCE, YOU SAY "NO, I CAN'T FORM A REASONABLE BELIEF EITHER THAT A CRIME WAS COMMITTED OR THAT THIS PERSON HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH IT, THEN YOUR OBLIGATION, OF COURSE, WOULD BE TO DECLINE TO INDICT, TO TURN THE CASE AWAY AND NOT HAVE IT GO FORWARD.

A GRAND JURY CONSISTS OF 23 MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY DRAWN AT RANDOM. I'VE USED THE TERM "INFAMOUS CRIME." AN INFAMOUS CRIME, UNDER OUR LAW, REFERS TO A SERIOUS CRIME WHICH CAN BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT BY MORE THAN ONE YEAR. THE PROSECUTORS WILL PRESENT FELONY CASES TO THE GRAND JURY. MISDEMEANORS, UNDER FEDERAL LAW, THEY HAVE DISCRETION TO CHARGE ON THEIR OWN. AND THEY'RE NOT -- THOSE CHARGES -- MISDEMEANORS AREN'T ENTITLED TO PRESENTMENT BEFORE A GRAND JURY.

BUT ANY CASE THAT CARRIES A PENALTY OF A YEAR OR MORE MUST BE PRESENTED TO -- ACTUALLY, MORE THAN A YEAR. A

YEAR AND A DAY OR LONGER MUST BE PRESENTED TO A GRAND JURY.

THE PURPOSE OF THE GRAND JURY, AS I MENTIONED, IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE'S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY A FORMAL ACCUSATION AGAINST A PERSON.

IF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS -- AND I DON'T MEAN THIS IN A DISPARAGING WAY. BUT IF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AGENTS AS WELL AS THE FOLKS THAT STAFF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT CHARGES TO AN IMPARTIAL GRAND JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT, THEN OFFICIALS IN OUR COUNTRY WOULD BE FREE TO ARREST AND BRING ANYONE TO TRIAL NO MATTER HOW LITTLE EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE CHARGE. WE DON'T WANT THAT. WE DON'T WANT THAT.

WE WANT THE BURDEN OF THE TRIAL TO BE JUSTIFIED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE THAT CONVINCES YOU OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT A CRIME PROBABLY OCCURRED AND THE PERSON IS PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE.

NOW, AGAIN, I MAKE THE DISTINCTION YOU DON'T HAVE TO VOTE ON ULTIMATE OUTCOMES. THAT'S NOT UP TO YOU. YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT IN EACH CASE, YOU INDICT THE PERSON WHO WILL BE ENTITLED TO A FULL SET OF RIGHTS AND THAT THERE WILL BE A JURY TRIAL IF THE PERSON ELECTS ONE. THE JURY WILL HAVE TO PASS ON THE ACCUSATION ONCE AGAIN USING A MUCH HIGHER STANDARD OF PROOF, PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

AS MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY, YOU, IN A VERY REAL

SENSE, STAND BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ACCUSED. IT'S YOUR DUTY TO SEE THAT INDICTMENTS ARE RETURNED ONLY AGAINST THOSE WHOM YOU FIND PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE ARE GUILTY AND TO SEE TO IT THAT THE INNOCENT ARE NOT COMPELLED TO GO TO TRIAL OR EVEN COMPELLED TO FACE AN ACCUSATION.

IF A MEMBER OF THE GRAND JURY IS RELATED BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE OR KNOWS OR SOCIALIZES TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO FIND HIMSELF OR HERSELF IN A BIASED STATE OF MIND AS TO THE PERSON UNDER INVESTIGATION OR ALTERNATIVELY YOU SHOULD FIND YOURSELF BIASED FOR ANY REASON, THEN THAT PERSON SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE INVESTIGATION UNDER QUESTION OR RETURN THE INDICTMENT.

ONE OF OUR GRAND JURORS, MS. GARFIELD, HAS RELATIVES THAT -- OBVIOUSLY, MS. GARFIELD, IF YOUR SON OR YOUR HUSBAND WAS EVER CALLED IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY, THAT WOULD BE A CASE WHERE YOU WOULD SAY, "THIS IS JUST TOO CLOSE. I'M GOING TO RECUSE MYSELF FROM THIS PARTICULAR CASE. NO ONE WOULD IMAGINE THAT I COULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMPARTIAL WHEN IT COMES TO MY OWN BLOOD RELATIVES."

SO THOSE ARE THE KINDS OF SITUATIONS THAT I REFER TO WHEN I TALK ABOUT EXCUSING YOURSELF FROM A PARTICULAR GRAND JURY DELIBERATION. IF THAT HAPPENS, YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO THE FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, FOR WHATEVER REASON, THAT YOU WANT TO BE EXCUSED FROM GRAND JURY DELIBERATIONS ON A PARTICULAR CASE OR CONSIDERATION OF A

PARTICULAR MATTER IN WHICH YOU FEEL YOU'RE BIASED OR YOU MAY HAVE A CONFLICT.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT IF YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY, YOU SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN AN INVESTIGATION. HOWEVER, IT DOES MEAN THAT IF YOU HAVE A FIXED STATE OF MIND BEFORE YOU HEAR EVIDENCE EITHER ON THE BASIS OF FRIENDSHIP OR BECAUSE YOU HATE SOMEBODY OR HAVE SIMILAR MOTIVATION, THEN YOU SHOULD STEP ASIDE AND NOT PARTICIPATE IN THAT PARTICULAR GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION AND IN VOTING ON THE PROPOSED INDICTMENT. THIS IS WHAT I MEANT WHEN I TALKED TO YOU ABOUT BEING FAIR-MINDED.

ALTHOUGH THE GRAND JURY HAS EXTENSIVE POWERS, THEY'RE LIMITED IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS.

FIRST, THESE ARE THE LIMITATIONS ON YOUR SERVICE: YOU CAN ONLY INVESTIGATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS. THAT'S YOUR CHARGE AS FEDERAL GRAND JURORS, TO LOOK AT VIOLATIONS OR SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW.

YOU ARE A FEDERAL GRAND JURY, AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WHICH VIOLATES STATE LAW, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IS OUTSIDE OF YOUR INQUIRY. IT MAY HAPPEN AND FREQUENTLY DOES HAPPEN THAT SOME OF THE CONDUCT THAT'S UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY ALSO VIOLATES STATE LAW. AND THIS IS FINE. THAT'S PROPER. BUT THERE ALWAYS HAS TO BE SOME FEDERAL CONNECTION TO WHAT IS UNDER INVESTIGATION OR YOU HAVE NO JURISDICTION.

THERE'S ALSO A GEOGRAPHIC LIMITATION ON THE SCOPE OF YOUR INQUIRIES AND THE EXERCISE OF YOUR POWERS. YOU MAY INQUIRE ONLY INTO FEDERAL OFFENSES COMMITTED IN OUR FEDERAL DISTRICT, WHICH INCLUDES SAN DIEGO AND IMPERIAL COUNTIES; THAT IS, THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

YOU MAY HAVE CASES THAT IMPLICATE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER AREAS, OTHER DISTRICTS, AND THERE MAY BE SOME EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN CONJUNCTION WITH WHAT GOES ON HERE THAT'S ALSO HAPPENING ELSEWHERE. THERE ALWAYS HAS TO BE A CONNECTION TO OUR DISTRICT.

THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, WE HAVE 93 DISTRICTS NOW. THE STATES ARE CUT UP LIKE PIECES OF PIE, AND EACH DISTRICT IS SEPARATELY DENOMINATED, AND EACH DISTRICT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN COUNTIES AND GEOGRAPHY. AND YOU, TOO, ARE BOUND BY THAT LIMITATION.

I'VE GONE OVER THIS WITH A COUPLE OF PEOPLE. YOU UNDERSTOOD FROM THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS THAT A COUPLE OF PEOPLE WERE EXCUSED, I THINK THREE IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT I'M ABOUT TO TELL YOU.

BUT IT'S NOT FOR YOU TO JUDGE THE WISDOM OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS ENACTED BY CONGRESS; THAT IS, WHETHER OR NOT THERE SHOULD BE A FEDERAL LAW OR SHOULD NOT BE A FEDERAL LAW DESIGNATING CERTAIN ACTIVITY IS CRIMINAL IS NOT UP TO YOU. THAT'S A JUDGMENT THAT CONGRESS MAKES.

AND IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THAT JUDGMENT MADE BY

CONGRESS, THEN YOUR OPTION IS NOT TO SAY "WELL, I'M GOING TO VOTE AGAINST INDICTING EVEN THOUGH I THINK THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT" OR "I'M GOING TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF EVEN THOUGH THE EVIDENCE MAY BE INSUFFICIENT." INSTEAD, YOUR OBLIGATION IS TO CONTACT YOUR CONGRESSMAN OR ADVOCATE FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAWS, BUT NOT TO BRING YOUR PERSONAL DEFINITION OF WHAT THE LAW OUGHT TO BE AND TRY TO IMPOSE THAT THROUGH APPLYING IT IN A GRAND JURY SETTING.

FURTHERMORE, WHEN YOU'RE DECIDING WHETHER TO INDICT OR NOT TO INDICT, YOU SHOULDN'T BE CONCERNED WITH PUNISHMENT THAT ATTACHES TO THE CHARGE. I THINK I ALSO ALLUDED TO THIS IN THE CONVERSATION WITH ONE GENTLEMAN. JUDGES ALONE DETERMINE PUNISHMENT. WE TELL TRIAL JURIES IN CRIMINAL CASES THAT THEY'RE NOT TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE MATTER OF PUNISHMENT EITHER. YOUR OBLIGATION AT THE END OF THE DAY IS TO MAKE A BUSINESS-LIKE DECISION ON FACTS AND APPLY THOSE FACTS TO THE LAW AS IT'S EXPLAINED AND READ TO YOU.

THE CASES WHICH YOU'LL APPEAR WILL COME BEFORE YOU IN VARIOUS WAYS. FREQUENTLY, PEOPLE ARE ARRESTED DURING OR SHORTLY AFTER THE COMMISSION OF AN ALLEGED CRIME. AND THEN THEY'RE TAKEN BEFORE A MAGISTRATE JUDGE, WHO HOLDS A PRELIMINARY HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER INITIALLY THERE'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE A PERSON'S COMMITTED A CRIME.

ONCE THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE FINDS PROBABLE CAUSE, HE OR SHE WILL DIRECT THAT THE ACCUSED PERSON BE HELD FOR ACTION

BY THE GRAND JURY. REMEMBER, UNDER OUR SYSTEM AND THE 5TH AMENDMENT, TRIALS OF SERIOUS AND INFAMOUS CRIMES CAN ONLY PROCEED WITH GRAND JURY ACTION. SO THE DETERMINATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE IS JUST TO HOLD THE PERSON UNTIL THE GRAND JURY CAN ACT. IT TAKES YOUR ACTION AS A GRAND JURY BEFORE THE CASE CAN FORMALLY GO FORWARD. IT'S AT THAT POINT THAT YOU'LL BE CALLED UPON TO CONSIDER WHETHER AN INDICTMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED IN A GIVEN CASE.

OTHER CASES MAY BE BROUGHT TO YOU BY THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OR AN ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY BEFORE AN ARREST IS MADE. BUT DURING THE COURSE OF AN INVESTIGATION OR AFTER AN INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED, THERE'S TWO WAYS THAT CASES GENERALLY ENTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS: THE REACTIVE OFFENSES WHERE, AS THE NAME IMPLIES, THE POLICE REACT TO A CRIME AND ARREST SOMEBODY. AND THOSE CASES WILL THEN BE SUBMITTED TO YOU AFTER MUCH OF THE FACTS ARE KNOWN. AND THEN THERE'S PROACTIVE CASES, CASES WHERE MAYBE THERE'S A SUSPICION OR A HUNCH OF WRONGDOING. THE FBI MAY BE CALLED UPON TO INVESTIGATE OR SOME OTHER FEDERAL AGENCY, AND THEY MAY NEED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE GRAND JURY IN FACILITATING THAT INVESTIGATION.

THE GRAND JURY HAS BROAD INVESTIGATORY POWERS. YOU HAVE THE POWER TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR RECORDS OR FOR PEOPLE TO APPEAR. SOMETIMES IT HAPPENS THAT PEOPLE SAY "I DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO YOU" TO THE FBI, AND THEY REFUSE TO TALK

TO THE AUTHORITIES. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, ON OCCASION, THE FBI MAY GO TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY AND SAY, "LOOK, YOU NEED TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED HERE. SUMMON THIS PERSON IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY." SO IT MAY BE THAT YOU'RE CALLED UPON TO EVALUATE WHETHER A CRIME OCCURRED AND WHETHER THERE OUGHT TO BE AN INDICTMENT. YOU, IN A VERY REAL SENSE, ARE PART OF THE INVESTIGATION.

IT MAY HAPPEN THAT DURING THE COURSE OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO ONE CRIME, IT TURNS OUT THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A DIFFERENT CRIME THAT SURFACES. YOU, AS GRAND JURORS, HAVE A RIGHT TO PURSUE THE NEW CRIME THAT YOU INVESTIGATE, EVEN CALLING NEW WITNESSES AND SEEKING OTHER DOCUMENTS OR PAPERS OR EVIDENCE BE SUBPOENAED.

NOW, IN THAT REGARD, THERE'S A CLOSE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE GRAND JURY AND THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE AND THE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. UNLIKE THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OR THOSE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES, THE GRAND JURY DOESN'T HAVE ANY POWER TO EMPLOY INVESTIGATORS OR TO EXPEND FEDERAL FUNDS FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES.

INSTEAD, YOU MUST GO BACK TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY AND ASK THAT THOSE THINGS BE DONE. YOU'LL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN YOUR INVESTIGATION OF CASES. IF ONE OR MORE GRAND JURORS WANT TO HEAR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON A CASE OR THINK THAT SOME ASPECT OF THE CASE OUGHT TO BE PURSUED, YOU MAY MAKE THAT REQUEST TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY.

IF THE U.S. ATTORNEY REFUSES TO ASSIST YOU OR IF YOU BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY IS NOT ACTING IMPARTIALLY, THEN YOU CAN TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH ME. I'M THE ASSIGNED JURY JUDGE, AND I WILL BE THE LIAISON WITH THE GRAND JURIES.

YOU CAN USE YOUR POWER TO INVESTIGATE EVEN OVER THE ACTIVE OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. IF THE MAJORITY OF YOU ON THE GRAND JURY THINK THAT A SUBJECT OUGHT TO BE PURSUED AND THE U.S. ATTORNEY THINKS NOT, THEN YOUR DECISION TRUMPS, AND YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE THAT INVESTIGATION PURSUED IF YOU BELIEVE IT'S NECESSARY TO DO SO IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

I MENTION THESE THINGS TO YOU AS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS IN MY EXPERIENCE HERE IN THE OVER 20 YEARS IN THIS COURT, THAT KIND OF TENSION DOES NOT EXIST ON A REGULAR BASIS, THAT I CAN RECALL, BETWEEN THE U.S. ATTORNEY AND GRAND JURIES. THEY GENERALLY WORK TOGETHER. THE U.S. ATTORNEY IS GENERALLY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GRAND JURY AND WHAT THE GRAND JURY WANTS.

IT'S IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT YOU WILL AND DO HAVE AN INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION AND THAT THAT FUNCTION IS PARAMOUNT TO EVEN WHAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY MAY WANT YOU TO DO.

IF YOU, AS I SAID, BELIEVE THAT AN INVESTIGATION OUGHT TO GO INTO OTHER AREAS BOTH IN TERMS OF SUBJECT MATTER, BEING A FEDERAL CRIME, AND GEOGRAPHICALLY, THEN YOU AS A GROUP CAN MAKE THAT DETERMINATION AND DIRECT THE INVESTIGATION THAT

WAY.

SINCE THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY HAS THE DUTY OF PROSECUTING PERSONS CHARGED WITH THE COMMISSION OF FEDERAL CRIMES, SHE OR ONE OF HER ASSISTANTS -- BY THE WAY, THE U.S. ATTORNEY IN OUR DISTRICT IS MS. CAROL LAM -- SHE OR ONE OF HER ASSISTANTS WILL PRESENT THE MATTERS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HAS DESIRES TO HAVE YOU CONSIDER. THE ATTORNEY WILL EDUCATE YOU ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES BY READING THE LAW TO YOU OR POINTING IT OUT, THE LAW THAT THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WAS VIOLATED. THE ATTORNEY WILL SUBPOENA FOR TESTIMONY BEFORE YOU SUCH WITNESSES AS THE LAWYER THINKS ARE IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AND ALLOW YOU TO DO YOUR FUNCTION, AND ALSO ANY OTHER WITNESSES THAT YOU MAY REQUEST THE ATTORNEY TO CALL IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER INVESTIGATION.

REMEMBER THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE GRAND JURY FUNCTION AND THAT OF THE TRIAL JURY IS THAT YOU ARE NOT PRESIDING IN A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL. IN MOST OF THE CASES THAT YOU APPEAR, THE LAWYER FOR THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT GOING TO BRING IN EVERYBODY THAT MIGHT BE BROUGHT IN AT THE TIME OF TRIAL; THAT IS, EVERYBODY THAT HAS SOME RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO OFFER. THEY'RE NOT GOING TO BRING IN EVERYONE WHO CONCEIVABLY COULD SAY SOMETHING THAT MIGHT BEAR ON THE OUTCOME. THEY'RE PROBABLY GOING TO BRING IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF WITNESSES JUST TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE. OFTENTIMES, THEY PRESENT A SKELETON CASE. IT'S EFFICIENT. IT'S ALL THAT'S NECESSARY.

IT SAVES TIME AND RESOURCES.

WHEN YOU ARE PRESENTED WITH A CASE, IT WILL TAKE 16 OF YOUR NUMBER OUT OF THE 23, 16 MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY OUT OF THE 23, TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. YOU CAN'T DO BUSINESS UNLESS THERE'S AT LEAST 16 MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY PRESENT FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS. IF FEWER THAN 16 GRAND JURORS ARE PRESENT EVEN FOR A MOMENT, THEN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GRAND JURY MUST STOP. YOU CAN NEVER OPERATE WITHOUT A QUORUM OF AT LEAST 16 MEMBERS PRESENT.

NOW, THE EVIDENCE THAT YOU WILL HEAR NORMALLY WILL CONSIST OF TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES AND WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. YOU MAY GET PHOTOGRAPHS. THE WITNESSES WILL APPEAR IN FRONT OF YOU SEPARATELY. WHEN A WITNESS FIRST APPEARS BEFORE YOU, THE GRAND JURY FOREPERSON WILL ADMINISTER AN OATH. THE PERSON MUST SWEAR OR AFFIRM TO TELL THE TRUTH. AND AFTER THAT'S BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THE WITNESS WILL BE QUESTIONED.

ORDINARILY, THE U.S. ATTORNEY PRESIDING AT THE -- REPRESENTING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AT THE GRAND JURY SESSION WILL ASK THE QUESTIONS FIRST. THEN THE FOREPERSON OF THE GRAND JURY MAY ASK QUESTIONS, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY MAY ASK QUESTIONS, ALSO.

I USED TO APPEAR IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY. I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I WOULD DO IS FREQUENTLY I'D ASK THE QUESTIONS, AND THEN I'D SEND THE WITNESS OUT AND ASK THE GRAND JURORS IF THERE WERE ANY QUESTIONS THEY WANTED ME TO ASK. AND THE

REASON I DID THAT IS THAT I HAD THE LEGAL TRAINING TO KNOW WHAT WAS RELEVANT AND WHAT MIGHT BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE.

A LOT OF TIMES PEOPLE WILL SAY, "WELL, HAS THIS PERSON EVER DONE IT BEFORE?" AND WHILE THAT MAY BE A RELEVANT QUESTION, ON THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, IT HAS TO BE ASSESSED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EVIDENCE OF THIS OCCASION OF CRIME THAT'S ALLEGED MUST BE ADEQUATE WITHOUT REGARD TO WHAT THE PERSON HAS DONE IN THE PAST. I WOULDN'T WANT THAT QUESTION ANSWERED UNTIL AFTER THE GRAND JURY HAD MADE A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THERE WAS ENOUGH EVIDENCE.

SO WHEN I APPEARED IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY, I'D TELL THEM "YOU'LL GET YOUR QUESTION ANSWERED, BUT I'D LIKE YOU TO VOTE ON THE INDICTMENT FIRST. I'D LIKE YOU TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE'S ENOUGH EVIDENCE BASED ON WHAT'S BEEN PRESENTED, AND THEN WE'LL ANSWER IT." I DIDN'T WANT TO PREJUDICE THE GRAND JURY. THERE MAY BE SIMILAR CONCERNS THAT COME UP. NOW, THE PRACTICES VARY AMONG THE ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS THAT WILL APPEAR IN FRONT OF YOU.

ON OTHER OCCASIONS WHEN I DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS ANY RISK THAT MIGHT PREJUDICE THE PROCESS, I WOULD ALLOW THE GRAND JURY TO FOLLOW UP THEMSELVES AND ASK QUESTIONS. A LOT OF TIMES, THE FOLLOW-UPS ARE FACTUAL ON DETAILED MATTERS. THAT PRACTICE WILL VARY DEPENDING ON WHO IS REPRESENTING THE UNITED

STATES AND PRESENTING THE CASE TO YOU. THE POINT IS YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OR TO ASK THAT THOSE QUESTIONS BE PUT TO THE WITNESS.

IN THE EVENT A WITNESS DOESN'T SPEAK OR UNDERSTAND ENGLISH, THEN ANOTHER PERSON WILL BE BROUGHT INTO THE ROOM. OBVIOUSLY, THAT WOULD BE AN INTERPRETER TO ALLOW YOU TO UNDERSTAND THE ANSWERS. WHEN WITNESSES DO APPEAR IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY, THEY SHOULD BE TREATED COURTEOUSLY. QUESTIONS SHOULD BE PUT TO THEM IN AN ORDERLY FASHION. THE QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT BE HOSTILE.

IF YOU HAVE ANY DOUBT WHETHER IT'S PROPER TO ASK A PARTICULAR QUESTION, THEN YOU CAN ASK THE U.S. ATTORNEY WHO'S ASSISTING IN THE INVESTIGATION FOR ADVICE ON THE MATTER. YOU ALONE AS GRAND JURORS DECIDE HOW MANY WITNESSES YOU WANT TO HEAR. WITNESSES CAN BE SUBPOENAED FROM ANYWHERE IN THE COUNTRY. YOU HAVE NATIONAL JURISDICTION.

HOWEVER, PERSONS SHOULD NOT ORDINARILY BE SUBJECTED TO DISRUPTION OF THEIR DAILY LIVES UNLESS THERE'S GOOD REASON. THEY SHOULDN'T BE HARASSED OR ANNOYED OR INCONVENIENCED. THAT'S NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE GRAND JURY HEARING, NOR SHOULD PUBLIC FUNDS BE EXPENDED TO BRING WITNESSES UNLESS YOU BELIEVE THAT THE WITNESSES CAN PROVIDE MEANINGFUL, RELEVANT EVIDENCE WHICH WILL ASSIST IN YOUR DETERMINATIONS AND YOUR INVESTIGATION.

ALL WITNESSES WHO ARE CALLED IN FRONT OF THE GRAND

JURY HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS. THESE INCLUDE, AMONG OTHERS, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION MIGHT INCRIMINATE THEM AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW THAT ANYTHING THEY SAY MIGHT BE USED AGAINST THEM.

THE U.S. ATTORNEYS ARE CHARGED WITH THE OBLIGATION, WHEN THEY'RE AWARE OF IT, OF ADVISING PEOPLE OF THIS RIGHT BEFORE THEY QUESTION THEM. BUT BEAR THAT IN MIND.

IF A WITNESS DOES EXERCISE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, THEN THE GRAND JURY SHOULD NOT HOLD THAT AS ANY PREJUDICE OR BIAS AGAINST THAT WITNESS. IT CAN PLAY NO PART IN THE RETURN OF AN INDICTMENT AGAINST THE WITNESS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE MERE EXERCISE OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, WHICH ALL OF US HAVE AS UNITED STATES RESIDENTS, SHOULD NOT FACTOR INTO YOUR DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THERE'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO GO FORWARD IN THIS CASE. YOU MUST RESPECT THAT DETERMINATION BY THE PERSON AND NOT USE IT AGAINST THEM.

IT'S AN UNCOMMON SITUATION THAT YOU'LL FACE WHEN SOMEBODY DOES CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THAT'S BECAUSE USUALLY AT THE TIME A PERSON IS SUBPOENAED, IF THERE'S A PROSPECT THAT THEY'RE GOING TO CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE, THE U.S. ATTORNEY IS PUT ON NOTICE OF THAT BEFOREHAND EITHER BY THE PERSON HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR MAYBE A LAWYER REPRESENTING THE PERSON.

IN MY EXPERIENCE, MOST OF THE TIME THE U.S. ATTORNEY

WILL NOT THEN CALL THE PERSON IN FRONT OF YOU BECAUSE IT WOULD BE TO NO EFFECT TO CALL THEM AND HAVE THEM ASSERT THEIR 5TH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE. BUT IT SOMETIMES DOES COME UP. IT SOMETIMES HAPPENS. SOMETIMES THERE'S A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PERSON HAS A BONA FIDE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THAT'S A MATTER FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE IN ANCILLARY PROCEEDINGS. OR THE U.S. ATTORNEY MAY BE UNAWARE OF A PERSON'S INCLINATION TO ASSERT THE 5TH. SO IT MAY COME UP IN FRONT OF YOU. IT DOESN'T ALWAYS COME UP.

AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN MY PRELIMINARY REMARKS, WITNESSES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO HAVE A LAWYER WITH THEM IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM. THE LAW DOESN'T PERMIT A WITNESS SUMMONED BEFORE THE GRAND JURY TO BRING THE LAWYER WITH THEM, ALTHOUGH WITNESSES DO HAVE A RIGHT TO CONFER WITH THEIR LAWYERS DURING THE COURSE OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION PROVIDED THE CONFERENCE OCCURS OUTSIDE THE GRAND JURY ROOM.

YOU MAY FACE A SITUATION WHERE A WITNESS SAYS "I'D LIKE TO TALK TO MY LAWYER BEFORE I ANSWER THAT QUESTION," IN WHICH CASE THE PERSON WOULD LEAVE THE ROOM, CONSULT WITH THE LAWYER, AND THEN COME BACK INTO THE ROOM WHERE FURTHER ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE.

APPEARANCES BEFORE A GRAND JURY SOMETIMES PRESENT COMPLEX LEGAL PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRE THE ASSISTANCE OF LAWYERS. YOU'RE NOT TO DRAW ANY ADVERSE INFERENCE IF A WITNESS DOES ASK TO LEAVE THE ROOM TO SPEAK TO HIS LAWYER OR HER LAWYER AND

THEN LEAVES FOR THAT PURPOSE.

ORDINARILY, NEITHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY WITNESS ON THE ACCUSED'S BEHALF WILL TESTIFY IN THE GRAND JURY SESSION. BUT UPON THE REQUEST OF AN ACCUSED, PREFERABLY IN WRITING, YOU MAY AFFORD THE ACCUSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR IN FRONT OF YOU.

AS I'VE SAID, THESE PROCEEDINGS TEND TO BE ONE-SIDED NECESSARILY. THE PROSECUTOR IS ASKING YOU TO RETURN AN INDICTMENT TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE, AND THEY'LL MUSTER THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE THAT THEY BELIEVE SUPPORTS PROBABLE CAUSE AND PRESENT THAT TO YOU. BECAUSE IT'S NOT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL, YOU'RE LIKELY IN MOST CASES NOT TO HEAR THE OTHER SIDE OF THE STORY, IF THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE TO THE STORY. THERE'S NO PROVISION OF LAW THAT ALLOWS AN ACCUSED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO CONTEST THE MATTER IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY.

IT MAY HAPPEN, AS I SAID, THAT AN ACCUSED MAY ASK TO APPEAR IN FRONT OF YOU. BECAUSE THE APPEARANCE OF SOMEONE ACCUSED OF A CRIME MAY RAISE COMPLICATED LEGAL PROBLEMS, YOU SHOULD SEEK THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S ADVICE AND COUNSEL, IF NECESSARY, AND THAT OF THE COURT BEFORE ALLOWING THAT.

BEFORE ANY ACCUSED PERSON IS ALLOWED TO TESTIFY, THEY MUST BE ADVISED OF THEIR RIGHTS, AND YOU SHOULD BE COMPLETELY SATISFIED THAT THEY UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY'RE DOING.

YOU'RE NOT REQUIRED TO SUMMON WITNESSES WHICH AN ACCUSED PERSON MAY WANT YOU TO HAVE EXAMINED UNLESS PROBABLE

CAUSE FOR AN INDICTMENT MAY BE EXPLAINED AWAY BY THE TESTIMONY OF THOSE WITNESSES.

NOW, AGAIN, THIS EMPHASIZES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY AND THE TRIAL JURY. YOU'RE ALL ABOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. IF YOU THINK THAT THERE'S EVIDENCE OUT THERE THAT MIGHT CAUSE YOU TO SAY "WELL, I DON'T THINK PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS," THEN IT'S INCUMBENT UPON YOU TO HEAR THAT EVIDENCE AS WELL. AS I TOLD YOU, IN MOST INSTANCES, THE U.S. ATTORNEYS ARE DUTY-BOUND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CUTS AGAINST WHAT THEY MAY BE ASKING YOU TO DO IF THEY'RE AWARE OF THAT EVIDENCE.

THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A WITNESS IS TELLING THE TRUTH IS SOMETHING FOR YOU TO DECIDE. NEITHER THE COURT NOR THE PROSECUTORS NOR ANY OFFICERS OF THE COURT MAY MAKE THAT DETERMINATION FOR YOU. IT'S THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF GRAND JURORS TO DETERMINE WHO IS CREDIBLE AND WHO MAY NOT BE.

FINALLY, LET ME TELL YOU THIS: THERE'S ANOTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR GRAND JURY PROCEDURE HERE AND PROCEDURES YOU MAY BE FAMILIAR WITH HAVING SERVED ON STATE TRIAL JURIES OR FEDERAL TRIAL JURIES OR EVEN ON THE STATE GRAND JURY; HEARSAY TESTIMONY, THAT IS, TESTIMONY AS TO FACTS NOT PERSONALLY KNOWN BY THE WITNESS, BUT WHICH THE WITNESS HAS BEEN TOLD OR RELATED BY OTHER PERSONS MAY BE DEEMED BY YOU PERSUASIVE AND MAY PROVIDE A BASIS FOR RETURNING AN INDICTMENT AGAINST AN ACCUSED.

WHAT I MEAN BY THAT IS IF IT'S A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL WHERE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY -- AND ALL OF US ARE FAMILIAR WITH THIS TERM "HEARSAY EVIDENCE." GENERALLY, IT FORBIDS SOMEBODY FROM REPEATING WHAT SOMEONE ELSE TOLD THEM OUTSIDE OF COURT. OH, THERE'S A MILLION EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BUT THAT'S THE GIST OF THE RULE.

USUALLY, WE INSIST ON THE SPEAKER OF THE WORDS TO COME IN SO THAT WE CAN KNOW THE CONTEXT OF IT. THAT RULE DOESN'T APPLY IN THE GRAND JURY CONTEXT. BECAUSE IT'S A PRELIMINARY PROCEEDING, BECAUSE ULTIMATELY GUILT OR INNOCENCE IS NOT BEING DETERMINED, THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS ARE RELAXED. THE PROSECUTORS ARE ENTITLED TO PUT ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

HOW DOES THAT PLAY OUT IN REAL LIFE? WELL, YOU'RE GOING TO BE HEARING A LOT OF BORDER TYPE CASES. IT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE, IT'S NOT EFFICIENT, IT'S NOT COST-EFFECTIVE TO PULL ALL OF OUR BORDER GUARDS OFF THE BORDER TO COME UP AND TESTIFY. WHO IS LEFT GUARDING THE BORDER, THEN?

WHAT THEY'VE DONE IN THE BORDER CASES IN PARTICULAR IF THEY USUALLY HAVE A SUMMARY WITNESS; A WITNESS FROM, FOR EXAMPLE, BORDER PATROL OR CUSTOMS WHO WILL TALK TO THE PEOPLE OR READ THE REPORTS OF THE PEOPLE WHO ACTUALLY MADE THE ARREST. THAT PERSON WILL COME IN AND TESTIFY ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED. THE PERSON WON'T HAVE FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE, BUT THEY'LL BE RELIABLY INFORMED BY THE PERSON WITH FIRST-HAND

KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT OCCURRED, AND THEY'LL BE THE WITNESS BEFORE THE GRAND JURY.

YOU SHOULD EXPECT AND COUNT ON THE FACT THAT YOU'RE GOING TO HEAR EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF HEARSAY THAT WOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE IF THE CASE GOES FORWARD TO TRIAL, BUT IS ADMISSIBLE AT THE GRAND JURY STAGE.

AFTER YOU'VE HEARD ALL OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY INTENDS TO PRESENT OR THAT YOU WANT TO HEAR IN A PARTICULAR MATTER, YOU'RE THEN CHARGED WITH THE OBLIGATION OF DELIBERATING TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED PERSON OUGHT TO BE INDICTED. NO ONE OTHER THAN YOUR OWN MEMBERS, THE MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY, IS TO BE PRESENT IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM WHILE YOU'RE DELIBERATING.

WHAT THAT MEANS IS THE COURT REPORTER, THE ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, ANYONE ELSE, THE INTERPRETER WHO MAY HAVE BEEN PRESENT TO INTERPRET FOR A WITNESS, MUST GO OUT OF THE ROOM, AND THE PROCEEDING MUST GO FORWARD WITH ONLY GRAND JURORS PRESENT DURING THE DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON AN INDICTMENT.

YOU HEARD ME EXPLAIN EARLIER THAT AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PRESENTATION OF MATTERS BEFORE YOU, OTHER PEOPLE MAY BE PRESENT IN THE GRAND JURY. THIS IS PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE. THE RULE THAT I HAVE JUST READ TO YOU ABOUT YOUR PRESENCE ALONE IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM APPLIES ONLY DURING DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON INDICTMENTS.

TO RETURN AN INDICTMENT CHARGING SOMEONE WITH AN

OFFENSE, IT'S NOT NECESSARY, AS I MENTIONED MANY TIMES, THAT YOU FIND PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. THAT'S THE TRIAL STANDARD, NOT THE GRAND JURY STANDARD. YOUR TASK IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S EVIDENCE, AS PRESENTED TO YOU, IS SUFFICIENT TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE'S PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE PROPOSED OR CHARGED OFFENSE.

I EXPLAINED TO YOU WHAT THAT STANDARD MEANS. LET ME, AT THE RISK OF BORING YOU, TELL YOU ONE MORE TIME.

PROBABLE CAUSE MEANS THAT YOU HAVE AN HONESTLY HELD CONSCIENTIOUS BELIEF AND THAT THE BELIEF IS REASONABLE THAT A FEDERAL CRIME WAS COMMITTED AND THAT THE PERSON TO BE INDICTED WAS SOMEHOW ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMISSION OF THAT CRIME. EITHER THEY COMMITTED IT THEMSELVES OR THEY HELPED SOMEONE COMMIT IT OR THEY WERE PART OF A CONSPIRACY, AN ILLEGAL AGREEMENT, TO COMMIT THAT CRIME.

TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, YOU SHOULD VOTE TO INDICT WHEN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO YOU IS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WARRANT A REASONABLE PERSON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE WHICH IS PROPOSED.

EACH GRAND JUROR HAS THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS VIEWS ON THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION. AND ONLY AFTER ALL GRAND JURORS HAVE BEEN GIVEN A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD SHOULD YOU VOTE ON THE MATTER BEFORE YOU. YOU MAY DECIDE AFTER DELIBERATION AMONG YOURSELVES THAT YOU NEED MORE EVIDENCE, THAT MORE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BEFORE A VOTE IS TAKEN. IN SUCH CASES, THE U.S ATTORNEY OR THE ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY CAN BE DIRECTED TO SUBPOENA ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS OR WITNESSES FOR YOU TO CONSIDER IN ORDER TO MAKE YOUR DETERMINATION.

WHEN YOU'VE DECIDED TO VOTE, THE FOREPERSON SHOULD KEEP A RECORD OF THE VOTE. THAT RECORD SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT. THE RECORD DOESN'T INCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE JURORS OR HOW THEY VOTED, BUT ONLY THE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR THE INDICTMENT. SO IT'S AN ANONYMOUS VOTE. YOU'LL KNOW AMONG YOURSELVES WHO VOTED WHICH WAY, BUT THAT INFORMATION DOES NOT GET CAPTURED OR RECORDED, JUST THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE VOTING FOR INDICTMENT.

IF 12 OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY AFTER DELIBERATION BELIEVE THAT AN INDICTMENT IS WARRANTED, THEN YOU'LL REQUEST THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY TO PREPARE A FORMAL WRITTEN INDICTMENT IF ONE'S NOT ALREADY BEEN PREPARED AND PRESENTED TO YOU. IN MY EXPERIENCE, MOST OF THE TIME THE U.S. ATTORNEY WILL SHOW UP WITH THE WITNESSES AND WILL HAVE THE PROPOSED INDICTMENT WITH THEM. SO YOU'LL HAVE THAT TO CONSIDER. YOU'LL KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE PROPOSED CHARGES ARE.

THE INDICTMENT WILL SET FORTH THE DATE AND THE PLACE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY BELIEVES MAKES THE CONDUCT CRIMINAL. IT WILL IDENTIFY THE CRIMINAL STATUTES THAT HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN

VIOLATED.

THE FOREPERSON, UPON THE GRAND JURY VOTING TO RETURN THE INDICTMENT, WILL THEN ENDORSE OR SIGN THE INDICTMENT, WHAT'S CALLED A TRUE BILL OF INDICTMENT. THERE'S A SPACE PROVIDED BY THE WORD -- OR FOLLOWED BY THE WORD "FOREPERSON." THE FOREPERSON IS TO SIGN THE INDICTMENT IF THE GRAND JURY BELIEVES THAT THERE'S PROBABLE CAUSE. A TRUE BILL SIGNIFIES THAT 12 OR MORE GRAND JURORS HAVE AGREED THAT THE CASE OUGHT TO GO FORWARD WITH PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON PROPOSED FOR THE CHARGE IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME.

IT'S THE DUTY OF THE FOREPERSON TO ENDORSE OR SIGN EVERY INDICTMENT VOTED ON BY AT LEAST 12 MEMBERS EVEN IF THE FOREPERSON HAS VOTED AGAINST RETURNING THE INDICTMENT. SO IF YOU'VE BEEN DESIGNATED A FOREPERSON OR AN ASSISTANT FOREPERSON, EVEN IF YOU VOTED THE OTHER WAY OR YOU'RE OUT-VOTED, IF THERE'S AT LEAST 12 WHO VOTED FOR THE INDICTMENT, THEN YOU MUST SIGN THE INDICTMENT.

IF YOU WERE THE 12 MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY WHO VOTED IN FAVOR OF THE INDICTMENT, THEN THE FOREPERSON WILL ENDORSE THE INDICTMENT WITH THESE WORDS: "NOT A TRUE BILL." THEY'LL RETURN IT TO THE COURT. THE COURT WILL IMPOUND IT.

THE INDICTMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ENDORSED AS A TRUE BILL ARE PRESENTED EITHER TO ONE OF OUR MAGISTRATE JUDGES OR TO A DISTRICT JUDGE IN OPEN COURT BY YOUR FOREPERSON AT THE CONCLUSION OF EACH SESSION OF THE GRAND JURY. THIS IS THE

PROCEDURE THAT YOU HEARD ME ALLUDE TO. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FOREPERSON, THE DEPUTY FOREPERSON SHALL PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE FOREPERSON.

LET ME EMPHASIZE AGAIN IT'S EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE GRAND JURORS TO REALIZE THAT UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, THE GRAND JURY IS AN INDEPENDENT BODY. IT'S INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY. IT'S NOT AN ARM OR AN AGENT OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE IRS, OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY CHARGED WITH PROSECUTING THE CRIME.

I USED THE CHARACTERIZATION EARLIER THAT YOU STAND AS A BUFFER BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ACCUSE SOMEONE OF A CRIME AND THEN PUTTING THAT PERSON THROUGH THE BURDEN OF STANDING TRIAL. YOU ACT AS AN INDEPENDENT BODY OF CITIZENS.

IN RECENT YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE GRAND JURY. THE CRITICISM GENERALLY IS THE GRAND JURY ACTS AS RUBBER STAMPS AND APPROVES PROSECUTIONS THAT ARE BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THOUGHT.

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN MY DISCUSSION WITH PROSPECTIVE GRAND JURORS, WE HAD ONE FELLOW WHO SAID, "YEAH, THAT'S THE WAY I THINK IT OUGHT TO BE." WELL, THAT'S NOT THE WAY IT IS. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, YOU WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH GOVERNMENT LAWYERS. THE U.S. ATTORNEY AND THE ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEYS WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH IMPORTANT SERVICES AND HELP YOU FIND YOUR WAY WHEN YOU'RE CONFRONTED WITH COMPLEX LEGAL

MATTERS. IT'S ENTIRELY PROPER THAT YOU SHOULD RECEIVE THE ASSISTANCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT LAWYERS.

BUT AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE DECISION ABOUT WHETHER A CASE GOES FORWARD AND AN INDICTMENT SHOULD BE RETURNED IS YOURS AND YOURS ALONE. IF PAST EXPERIENCE IS ANY INDICATION OF WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE, THEN YOU CAN EXPECT THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEYS THAT WILL APPEAR IN FRONT OF YOU WILL BE CANDID, THEY'LL BE HONEST, THAT THEY'LL ACT IN GOOD FAITH IN ALL MATTERS PRESENTED TO YOU.

HOWEVER, AS I SAID, ULTIMATELY YOU HAVE TO DEPEND ON YOUR INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN MAKING THE DECISION THAT YOU ARE CHARGED WITH MAKING AS GRAND JURORS. YOU'RE NOT AN ARM OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. YOU'RE NOT AN ARM OF ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY. THE GOVERNMENT'S LAWYERS ARE PROSECUTORS, AND YOU'RE NOT.

IF THE FACTS SUGGEST TO YOU THAT YOU SHOULD NOT INDICT, THEN YOU SHOULD NOT DO SO EVEN IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION OR STATEMENTS OR ARGUMENTS FROM ONE OF THE ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS. YOU SHOULD NOT SURRENDER AN HONESTLY OR CONSCIOUSLY HELD BELIEF WITHOUT THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND SIMPLY DEFER TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY. THAT'S YOUR DECISION TO MAKE.

JUST AS YOU MUST MAINTAIN YOUR INDEPENDENCE IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE COURT MUST BE ON A FORMAL BASIS, ALSO. IF YOU HAVE A QUESTION FOR

THE COURT OR A DESIRE TO MAKE A PRESENTMENT OR A RETURN OF AN INDICTMENT TO THE COURT, THEN YOU MAY CONTACT ME THROUGH MY CLERK. YOU'LL BE ABLE TO ASSEMBLE IN THE COURTROOM OFTENTIMES FOR THESE PURPOSES.

LET ME TELL YOU ALSO THAT EACH GRAND JUROR IS DIRECTED TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THE COURT ANY ATTEMPT BY ANYBODY UNDER ANY PRETENSE WHATSOEVER TO ADDRESS YOU OR CONTACT YOU FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRYING TO GAIN INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY. THAT SHOULD NOT HAPPEN. IF IT DOES HAPPEN, I SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THAT IMMEDIATELY BY ANY OF YOU, COLLECTIVELY OR INDIVIDUALLY. IF ANY PERSON CONTACTS YOU OR ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE YOU IN ANY MANNER IN CARRYING OUT YOUR DUTIES AS A GRAND JUROR, LET ME KNOW ABOUT IT.

LET ME TALK A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT THE OBLIGATION OF SECRECY, WHICH I'VE MENTIONED AND ALLUDED TO. AS I TOLD YOU BEFORE, THE HALLMARK OF THE GRAND JURY, PARTICULARLY OUR FEDERAL GRAND JURY, IS THAT IT OPERATES SECRETLY. IT OPERATES IN SECRECY, AND ITS PROCEEDINGS ARE ENTIRELY SECRET.

YOUR PROCEEDINGS AS GRAND JURORS ARE ALWAYS SECRET, AND THEY MUST REMAIN SECRET PERMANENTLY UNLESS AND UNTIL THE COURT DETERMINES OTHERWISE. YOU CAN'T RELATE TO YOUR FAMILY, THE NEWS MEDIA, TELEVISION REPORTERS, OR TO ANYONE WHAT HAPPENED IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY. IN FACT, TO DO SO IS TO COMMIT A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. YOU COULD BE HELD CRIMINALLY

LIABLE FOR REVEALING WHAT OCCURRED IN FRONT OF THE GRAND JURY.

THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPORTANT REASONS WHY WE DEMAND SECRECY IN THE INSTITUTION OF THE GRAND JURY. FIRST -- AND I MENTIONED THIS, AND THIS IS OBVIOUS -- THE PREMATURE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION THAT THE GRAND JURY IS ACTING ON COULD VERY WELL FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE IN PARTICULAR CASES. IT MIGHT GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOMEONE WHO'S ACCUSED OF A CRIME TO ESCAPE OR BECOME A FUGITIVE OR TO DESTROY EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE UNCOVERED LATER ON. YOU DON'T WANT TO DO THAT.

IN THE COURSE OF AN INVESTIGATION, IT'S ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE THAT THE INVESTIGATION AND THE FACTS OF THE INVESTIGATION REMAIN SECRET, AND YOU SHOULD KEEP THAT FOREMOST IN YOUR MIND. ALSO, IF THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS IS DISCLOSED, THE WITNESS MAY BE SUBJECT TO INTIMIDATION OR SOMETIMES RETALIATION OR BODILY INJURY BEFORE THE WITNESS IS ABLE TO TESTIFY. IT IS SOMETHING THAT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT -- IT'S SOMETIMES THE CASE THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT WILL TELL A WITNESS WHO IS COOPERATING WITH AN INVESTIGATION THAT THEIR SECRECY IS GUARANTEED. IT SOMETIMES TAKES THAT KIND OF ASSURANCE FROM THE POLICE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS TO GET A WITNESS TO TELL WHAT THEY KNOW. AND THAT GUARANTEE CAN ONLY BE SECURED IF YOU MAINTAIN THE OBLIGATION OF SECRECY.

THE GRAND JURY IS FORBIDDEN BY LAW FROM DISCLOSING ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE GRAND JURY PROCESS WHATSOEVER. IT'S

ON THE BASIS SOMETIMES OF REPRESENTATIONS LIKE THAT RELUCTANT WITNESSES DO COME FORWARD. AGAIN, IT UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY.

AS I'VE ALSO MENTIONED, THE REQUIREMENT OF SECRECY PROTECTS INNOCENT PEOPLE WHO MAY HAVE COME UNDER INVESTIGATION, BUT WHO ARE CLEARED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE GRAND JURY. IT'S A TERRIBLE THING TO BE IMPROPERLY ACCUSED OF A CRIME. IT'S LIKE A SCARLET LETTER THAT PEOPLE SOMETIMES WEAR FOREVER. IT'S WORSE IF THE CRIME OR THE ACCUSATION NEVER BECOMES FORMAL. JUST THE IDEA THAT SOMEONE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION CAN HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THAT PERSON OR HIS OR HER BUSINESS OR HIS OR HER FAMILY. THIS IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT REASON WHY THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS MUST REMAIN SECRET.

IN THE EYES OF SOME PEOPLE, INVESTIGATION BY THE GRAND JURY ALONE CARRIES WITH IT THE STIGMA OR SUGGESTION OF GUILT. SO GREAT INJURY CAN BE DONE TO A PERSON'S GOOD NAME EVEN THOUGH ULTIMATELY YOU DECIDE THAT THERE'S NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING AN INDICTMENT OF THE PERSON.

TO ENSURE THE SECRECY OF THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, THE LAW PROVIDES THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED PEOPLE MAY BE IN THE GRAND JURY ROOM WHILE EVIDENCE IS BEING PRESENTED. AS I'VE MENTIONED TO YOU NOW SEVERAL TIMES, THE ONLY PEOPLE WHO MAY BE PRESENT DURING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE GRAND JURY ARE THE GRAND JURORS THEMSELVES, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OR AN ASSISTANT

WHO'S PRESENTING THE CASE, A WITNESS WHO IS THEN UNDER EXAMINATION, A COURT REPORTER, AND AN INTERPRETER, IF NECESSARY. ALL THE OTHERS EXCEPT THE GRAND JURORS GO OUT DURING THE DELIBERATION AND VOTING.

YOU MAY DISCLOSE TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY WHO IS ASSISTING THE GRAND JURY CERTAIN INFORMATION. AS I SAID, IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, IF GRAND JURORS HAVE QUESTIONS THAT THEY WANT ANSWERED, OBVIOUSLY THAT INFORMATION IS TO BE CONVEYED TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY TO GET THE QUESTIONS ANSWERED.

BUT YOU SHOULD NOT DISCLOSE THE CONTEXT OF YOUR DELIBERATIONS OR THE VOTE OF ANY PARTICULAR GRAND JUROR TO ANYONE, EVEN THE GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, ONCE THE VOTE HAS BEEN DONE. THAT'S ONLY THE BUSINESS OF THE GRAND JURY. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU'RE NOT TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER WHO VOTED ONE WAY ON THE INDICTMENT AND WHO VOTED THE OTHER WAY.

LET ME CONCLUDE NOW -- I APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE, AND IT'S BEEN A LONG SESSION THIS MORNING -- BY SAYING THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SERVICE YOU PERFORM IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE VERY IMPORTANT AND COMPREHENSIVE OATH WHICH YOU TOOK A SHORT WHILE AGO. IT'S AN OATH THAT IS ROOTED IN OUR HISTORY AS A COUNTRY. THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE BEFORE YOU HAVE TAKEN A SIMILAR OATH. AND AS GOOD CITIZENS, YOU SHOULD BE PROUD TO HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO ASSIST IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

IT HAS BEEN MY PLEASURE TO MEET YOU. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE YOU IN THE FUTURE IF THE NEED ARISES. AT THIS

POINT, THE U.S. ATTORNEY, MR. ROBINSON, WILL ASSIST YOU IN FURTHER ORGANIZATION. SO THIS PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS GRAND JURORS INVOLVING THE COURT IS OVER.

IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO TAKE A BREAK BEFORE WE GO ON TO THE NEXT PROCEEDING. I'VE HELD THESE FOLKS FOR A LONG TIME.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, MY GREAT PLEASURE TO MEET ALL OF YOU. GOOD LUCK WITH YOUR GRAND JURY SERVICE. I THINK YOU'LL FIND IT REWARDING AND INTERESTING AND COMPELLING.

--OOO--

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE TESTIMONY ADDUCED IN THE FOREGOING MATTER IS A TRUE RECORD OF SAID PROCEEDINGS.

____

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. **ANA PALOS-MONTES,** Defendant.	Case No. 08CR1726-LAB PROOF OF SERVICE

Counsel for Defendant certifies that the foregoing pleading is true and accurate to the best of her information and belief, and that a copy of the foregoing document has been served via CM/ECF this day upon:

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Dated: June 30, 2008

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